Note by the Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties has received a communication from Liechtenstein on the outcome of an inter-sessional meeting held in Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America, from 8 to 11 June 2006. In accordance with the request in the communication, a report on the outcome of the inter-sessional meeting is submitted to the Assembly.
Informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, United States of America, from 8 to 11 June 2006

Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Summary of proceedings</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The act of aggression – defining the conduct of the State............</td>
<td>7-50</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction</td>
<td>51-83</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The crime of aggression – defining the individual’s conduct ......</td>
<td>84-95</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Future work of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression</td>
<td>96-102</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Options for rewording the chapeau of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper under the differentiated approach</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Annotated agenda</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. List of participants</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Introduction

1. Pursuant to a recommendation by the Assembly of States Parties and at the invitation of the Government of Liechtenstein, an informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression was held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, New Jersey, United States of America, from 8 to 11 June 2006. Invitations to participate in the meeting had been sent to all States, as well as to representatives of civil society. Ambassador Christian Wenaweser (Liechtenstein) chaired the meeting. The annotated agenda of the meeting is contained in annex III.

2. The participants in the informal inter-sessional meeting expressed their appreciation to the Governments of Canada, Finland, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland for the financial support they had provided for the meeting and to the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University for hosting and giving financial support for the event.

3. The participants observed a minute of silence in memory of Dr. Medard Rwelamira, the late Secretary of the Assembly of States Parties, who passed away on 3 April 2006. The Chairman paid tribute to the outstanding assistance provided to the Special Working Group by Dr. Rwelamira, who had been a dear colleague and close friend of many delegates.

4. The meeting noted with regret that the delegation of Cuba had, once more, been denied permission to travel to Princeton to attend the meeting, in spite of efforts by the President of the Assembly and the Chair of the Special Working Group.

5. The present document does not necessarily represent the views of the governments that the participants represent. It seeks to reflect the opinions expressed on various issues pertaining to the crime of aggression and to set out the conclusions reached. It is understood that these issues will have to be reassessed in light of further work on the crime of aggression. It is hoped that the material in the present document will facilitate the work of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression.

II. Summary of proceedings

6. It was decided to focus the work in Princeton on the five items listed in the annotated agenda of the meeting: the “crime” of aggression – defining the individual’s conduct; the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction; the “act” of aggression – defining the act of the State; other substantive issues; and future work of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression. Particular attention was devoted to the issues identified in the discussion papers submitted to the Special Working Group: discussion paper No. 1, entitled “The crime of aggression and article 25, paragraph 3, of the Statute”; discussion paper No. 2, entitled “The conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression”; and discussion paper No. 3, entitled “Definition of aggression in the context of the Statute of the ICC”. The Chairman reminded participants that the work of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression continued to be based on the discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator¹ (reproduced in annex II and hereinafter referred to as the “2002 Coordinator’s paper”).

¹ Contained in document PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2.
A. The act of aggression – defining the conduct of the State

Generic versus specific approach

7. There was extensive discussion of whether the definition of the act of aggression at the State level as referred to in section I, paragraph 2 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper should be generic or specific. It was recalled that a generic definition was one which does not include a list of acts of aggression, while a specific definition was accompanied by such a list, for example the one contained in United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.

8. Several participants favoured a generic definition. It was argued that a generic definition was the most pragmatic approach as it would be impossible to capture all instances in which the crime of aggression would be applicable. The point was made that the option of an illustrative list, such as that contained in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), was difficult to reconcile with the need to respect the principle of legality. Some delegations pointed out that a specific list might create conflicts of jurisdiction between the Security Council and the Court, while others argued that such risks were alleviated by the fact that it was for the Court to determine which cases fell under the definition of aggression.

9. Those participants who favoured a specific approach felt that a detailed list of acts was more likely to ensure legal clarity and consistency with the definitions of other crimes in articles 6 to 8 of the Rome Statute. It was stressed that a specific definition was essential in light of the importance of the crime and the requirements set forth under article 22 of the Statute. The point was made that some specific acts listed in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), such as the “blockade of the ports or coasts of a State” (article 3(c) of the resolution) might not be captured by a generic definition.

10. However, it was also emphasized that the generic and specific approaches could easily be combined by including a general chapeau and a non-exhaustive list of specific acts.

11. Reference was made in this context to the example of article 7 of the Rome Statute dealing with crimes against humanity, which combines a generic chapeau with a specific but open-ended list (“other inhumane acts”). It was noted that the illustrative list contained in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) provided a good starting point, since that resolution was generally accepted and offered some leeway for taking new developments into account.

12. Participants agreed that the principle of legality should be safeguarded. It was pointed out that the principle of legality allowed for some flexibility according to article 15, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant for the Protection of Civil and Political Rights, which was drafted with the Nuremberg crimes, including the crime of aggression, in mind.

13. Regarding the definition of the crime of aggression, it was suggested that a comprehensive definition be included, making reference to all relevant precedents: the Nuremberg Charter, as affirmed by General Assembly resolution 95(I); Principle VI of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal, adopted by the International Law Commission in 1950; General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX); and the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission in 1996.

---

2 Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.
Description of the act of aggression

14. A discussion took place on how to describe the aggression by a State, whether to use the words “use of force”, “armed attack”, “act of aggression” or “use of armed force”. It was recalled that the Charter of the United Nations uses a variety of relevant notions (Article 2 (4), Article 39, Article 51) and that all the terms listed above refer to the quality of the act (as opposed to the intensity of the act, which is encompassed in the qualifiers “flagrant” or “manifest”).

15. Many participants preferred to retain the notion of “act of aggression” in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper and the reference therein to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) which, in article 1, defines the act of aggression as the “use of armed force”. Any departure from this resolution should be considered with caution. The view was expressed that the term “act of aggression” was necessary to link the collective act of the State to the crime committed by the individual. It was suggested that the word “collective” could be added to underline the distinction between the act of the State and the individual crime of aggression.

16. Some delegations expressed a preference for the term “armed attack”. A concern was expressed that the term “act of aggression” might be too broad to serve as a basis for defining the crime of aggression in accordance with customary international law.

17. The point was also made that the practical implications of using one term in preference to another were limited, since all four were used in different parts of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). The difference in wording and meaning would only become material if a generic approach were to be chosen.

Qualifying the State’s act as a “flagrant” or “manifest” violation of the Charter

18. There was a discussion about the phrase “which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations” in section I, paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper. Some participants stressed that there was no need for an additional qualifier of the term “violation of the Charter”. It was argued that an act of aggression typically entailed an attack against the “sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State” (article 1 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX)), which was serious enough not to warrant any further qualification. Another point made was that the idea of a threshold was inherent in the limitation of the jurisdiction of the Court under article 1 of the Rome Statute (“most serious crimes of international concern”) and would be taken into account in the practice of the Court. Criminal prosecution of the crime of aggression was tied to a prior determination by the Security Council. The phrase under discussion was technically not part of the definition of the act, but circumstances could be taken into account in the course of criminal proceedings, even in the absence of such a phrase (e.g. under articles 31 and 32 of the Statute). Moreover, both terms were uncertain and difficult to distinguish in substance; a qualifier should therefore rather refer to the gravity of the act.

19. Some participants continued to support the retention of the phrase, as it would serve to exclude some borderline cases. They generally favoured introducing the idea of a threshold, which could for example be achieved through the use of a qualifier. It was noted that the crime of aggression had to be seen in the context of the preamble as well as article 1 of the Rome Statute, both of which made reference to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community”.

20. A general preference was noted for the term ‘manifest’ rather than ‘flagrant’ if a qualifier was to be retained.
Limiting jurisdiction to acts amounting to “war of aggression”

21. It was noted that the concept of limiting the jurisdiction to acts amounting to a “war of aggression”, which was based on the Nuremberg precedent, had been raised during the Preparatory Commission and was reflected in option 2 of paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper.

22. It was also noted that option 1 of paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper dealt with the issue of a war of aggression, but did not limit the jurisdiction to such acts.

23. The predominant view was that the inclusion of a reference to a “war of aggression” in the definition would be too restrictive, in particular in light of the acts specified in article 3 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), and that option 3 of paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper was therefore preferable.

24. The view was also expressed that the acts in question should be tantamount to a “war of aggression” in order that there should be no deviation from customary international law. Opinions differed, however, on what customary law required.

Relevance of object or result of an act of aggression

25. A discussion took place about whether the object or the result of an act of aggression should be relevant. Options 1 and 2 of paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper contain such references (“object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof”).

26. Most participants voiced a preference for not including the object or result in this paragraph. The reasons for not doing so included: the fact that the object extended into the ius in bello, whereas the crime of aggression fell within the ius ad bellum; the difficulties in making an exhaustive enumeration of the objects or results; the fact that articles 3 and 5 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) only included military occupation or annexation as examples of aggression; and the fact that the Security Council did not refer to the object or result in its decisions relating to aggression.

27. The point was made that military occupation should be included in the definition, in order to address the continuity of the situation after the attack has occurred. It was pointed out, however, that article 3, subparagraph a) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) already dealt with military occupation as a continuum, and that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court were not subject to any statute of limitations (article 29 of the Rome Statute).

28. Although several participants favoured the inclusion of a threshold in section I, paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper, it was noted that this need not be done by pursuing either one of the two options. However, some support was expressed for including option 2.

29. The view was also expressed that article 4 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) allowed the Security Council to determine other acts which could constitute aggression. There might therefore not be a need to restrict the definition of aggression; the goal of establishing a threshold could be achieved in the elements of the crime.

30. It was also observed that option 1 of paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper would not add much since the example it contained was a clear case of aggression; it would be better to cite a less obvious case of an act of aggression as an example.
31. Noting the importance of differentiating between the crime of aggression and the act of aggression, it was stressed that the definition of an act of aggression should be contained exclusively in section I, paragraph 2 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper.

The reference to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX)

32. Participants discussed how and to what extent the provision on aggression should make reference to the definition of aggression under General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). Three options were mentioned: a generic reference to resolution 3314 (XXIX), such as the one contained in section I, paragraph 2 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper; reference only to specific parts of resolution 3314 (XXIX), in particular its articles 1, 3 and 4; or reproduction of parts of the text of the resolution in the provision itself.

33. Many participants expressed a preference for a generic reference to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). It was argued that such a reference would be consistent with the need to preserve the integrity of the resolution, respect the interconnected nature of its provisions (article 8) and, in particular, cover also articles 1 and 4, which were relevant in this context. This approach would, further, avoid time-consuming discussion surrounding the selection of specific acts. It was pointed out that a generic reference would not be inconsistent with the structure of crimes under the Rome Statute, since the act described in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) was not the individual conduct of the perpetrator, but the collective act of the State and thus a circumstance element.

34. The view was expressed that section I, paragraph 2 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper needed to be redrafted if a generic approach were to be adopted. It was observed that use of the term “act of aggression” in the current text might be interpreted as a mere reference to the acts of aggression listed in article 3 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). It was suggested that paragraph 2 be reworded to make it clear that reference was not being made to article 3 only, but also to the other relevant provisions of the resolution, in particular its articles 1 and 4. It was recalled that there was no consensus on the use of the term “act of aggression” in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper and that alternative language had been suggested to cover the notion of “act of aggression”.

35. Some participants favoured the idea of reproducing specific paragraphs of resolution 3314 (XXIX) over the option of a generic reference. It was argued that a generic reference to resolution 3314 (XXIX), including its open-ended paragraph 4, lacked the degree of specificity required in the context of individual criminal responsibility. It was suggested that the act of aggression should be defined on the basis of a combination of article 1 and an illustrative enumeration of the acts contained in article 3 of the resolution.

Attempt of aggression by a State

36. It was noted that the question of whether an attempt of an act of aggression by a State should be included had not been reflected explicitly in the 2002 Coordinator’s paper and that the question had only arisen at the 2005 inter-sessional meeting in connection with the discussions on an individual’s attempt to commit the crime of aggression.

37. Some participants voiced their approval for including attempt of aggression. It was noted that this would reinforce the need for a threshold because attempt would broaden the range of acts that would be covered.

38. It was further noted that a determination of whether or not an attempt took place would be difficult. Although considered theoretically possible, it was deemed unlikely that
the United Nations Security Council would discuss and determine that an act of aggression had been attempted.

39. It was noted that the difficulty lay in the fact that an individual’s actions were inevitably linked to those of the State. Caution was expressed against including anything relating to planning or preparation because, according to Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, an act of aggression needed to have actually occurred.

40. Another view held that, if attempt was to be included, it would have to be defined separately from the crime of aggression per se, which referred to a completed act.

41. The view was further expressed that changes to the 2002 Coordinator’s paper might not be required since the concept of attempt might be catered for when the Security Council took the respective decision.

42. Several participants, however, were not in favour of explicitly including the concept of attempt. The text in the 2002 Coordinator’s paper was best retained unaltered and there was little to gain from defining an attempt of aggression by a State. In that context, it was noted that some of the acts which participants favouring the inclusion of attempt had mentioned by way of examples had in fact already been covered by the 2002 Coordinator’s paper; they would not have to be considered attempts, but could be considered completed acts of aggression. Examples such as the launching of a missile against another country, which missed its target, would constitute use of force and be covered by General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) irrespective of whether they were carried out successfully or not. It was added that the concept of the “first use of armed force by a State” in article 2 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) confirmed this understanding.

43. In this connection, the importance of not deviating from the content of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) was stressed. That resolution had been adopted by consensus after very lengthy discussions and constituted customary international law.

44. Some discussion also took place regarding an attack that was neutralized outside the national territory which should be considered a completed act of aggression; the characteristics of modern warfare were such that the crossing of territorial borders was not a prerequisite for the commission of an act of aggression. In this connection it was pointed out that General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) did not require that a territorial border be crossed by the armed forces of a State, but that armed force was used against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State.

45. There was some discussion as to whether the first part of the phrase “planning, preparation, initiation or execution”, contained in section I, paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper, could be construed as encompassing the concept of attempt, bearing in mind that the first two words related to situations prior to an act of aggression. Nonetheless, the view was expressed that the phrase referred to the acts of participation of an individual in the commission of a crime of aggression rather than the act of State. It was further noted that the deletion of the phrase in paragraph 1 had already been suggested in a different context.

46. As a result of the discussion, the prevailing view appeared to be that the 2002 Coordinator’s paper already covered certain types of acts which might be considered attempts, and might thus suffice.

47. The question of whether or not the definition should also cover the “threat” of aggression was also discussed. Participants agreed that the notion of “attempt” had to be differentiated from the notion of “threat” which, albeit similar to attempt, nonetheless constituted a different concept which was not reflected in the 2002 Coordinator’s paper. A
threat was mainly a verbal expression, but it could include other, more substantial activities, and it would be broader than an attempted act of aggression. The question of retaining an appropriate threshold was therefore particularly important.

48. It was noted that the threat of aggression had been included in the early versions of the draft code of crimes prepared by the International Law Commission, but that such a notion had disappeared in the Commission’s draft of the 1990s.

49. It was stated that including the concept of threat would create complications because the word threat was contextual, not necessarily having the same meaning in one situation as in another. Nonetheless, a view was also expressed that the concept of threat—particularly if backed up by substantial or credible activities—should be considered more closely.

50. The point was made that the work on the crime of aggression would influence the interpretation of provisions regarding the use of force in general and acts of aggression by States. Issues such as the interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, imminent use of force and the pre-emptive right of self-defence should be avoided.

B. Conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction

51. At the 2005 inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, a substantive discussion was held on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. The issues were examined further in discussion paper No. 2. Following the suggestion contained in that paper, further discussions were held to clarify the issues involved, with the aim of setting the stage for later agreement.

Prior determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court

52. Opinions differed as to whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression should be conditioned on a prior determination of the act of aggression by the Security Council or another body outside the Court.

53. The view was expressed that there was no need for any special provisions on a prior determination of an act of aggression by the Security Council, since articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute dealt sufficiently with the role of the Security Council under the Statute. In this context, reference was also made to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations in relation to the obligations under the Rome Statute.

54. Some participants argued that a predetermination of an act of aggression by another organ was a possible scenario, but should not constitute a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute dealt sufficiently with the role of the Security Council, and in the absence of a determination from the Council, or any other organ, the Court could still proceed and make its own determination that an act of aggression had occurred.

55. In this context, attention was drawn to the independence of the Court and the distinct functions of the Security Council and the Court with respect to aggression. It was noted that Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations gave the Security Council primary, but not exclusive responsibility with regard to aggression. It was argued that the prerogative of the

---

3 The original discussion paper is reproduced in the Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Fourth session, The Hague, 28 November to 3 December 2005 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-ASP/4/32), annex II.C. At the inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group, the discussion centered on a revised version of the paper.
Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter was confined to the determination of, inter alia, acts of aggression, with a view to taking measures relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and did not extend to making a judicial determination concerning aggression for the purpose of individual criminal proceedings. In any case, it could not be argued that other bodies did not have the competence to make such a determination. The point was made that the International Court of Justice had on several occasions determined that aggression had occurred, without prior Security Council determination. It was also pointed out that individual States could also make an independent determination on the existence of an act of aggression, for example when invoking the right to self-defence or for the purpose of individual criminal proceedings at the national level. Lastly, it was recalled that, under article 16 of the Statute, the Security Council always had the possibility to request the deferral of an investigation or prosecution by the Court.

56. The view was expressed that the crime of aggression merited being considered in the same manner as the other crimes falling under the Court’s jurisdiction, in accordance with article 13 of the Rome Statute. The Court did not therefore necessarily require a prior determination that an act of aggression had occurred in order to exercise its jurisdiction. In this connection, the deletion of options 2 to 5 under paragraph 5 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper was suggested.

57. Some participants were of the view that the Court should only be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after the Security Council or another organ had determined that an act of aggression had been committed. There was a preference for such a determination to be made by the Security Council. Reference was made to the authority of the Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations and to article 5, paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute, which required that any provision on the crime of aggression be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter. Moreover, it was noted that the involvement of the Security Council was appropriate and that it was difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between responsibilities in the field of international peace and security and jurisdictional issues in the context of aggression.

58. Nonetheless, some participants were of the view that the precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court could be satisfied by the determination of a body other than the Security Council, such as the General Assembly of the United Nations or the International Court of Justice. It was suggested that the General Assembly be allowed either to make the determination or to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

59. In connection with General Assembly involvement, it was noted that further reflection was warranted as to the type of “recommendation” that would be sought (cf. 2002 Coordinator’s paper): a recommendation that the Court proceed or a recommendation that an act of aggression had occurred.

60. Some doubts were expressed about whether it would be desirable, from a legal perspective, to involve the International Court of Justice, since it would apply different standards of proof than the Court. It was also considered preferable to avoid the duplication of effort that would occur if a matter were considered first by the International Court of Justice and then by the International Criminal Court.

61. In order to reconcile the divergent views regarding the respective roles of the Security Council and the Court, it was suggested that different solutions might be found for each of the three scenarios set out in article 13 of the Statute. Under article 13(a), a State could make a self-referral to the Court in the event of its being unable to conduct the trial at the national level. In such a case, it might be easier to accept the Court’s jurisdiction without the involvement of another organ. It would, however, be necessary to make a distinction between a self-referral and other referrals made by States. Under article 13(b), the Security Council
could refer a situation to the Court which might involve all crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction, including the crime of aggression. In such a case, the Security Council might consider it beneficial to leave the issue to the Court instead of making its own determination at that stage. Under this option, it might be more acceptable to give the Court greater autonomy in the determination of an act of aggression, since the Security Council itself would have referred the situation to the Court. Under article 13(c) the Prosecutor would initiate an investigation *proprio motu*. This seemed to be the only scenario envisaged by the 2002 Coordinator’s paper. It was therefore suggested that a distinction be made between the different scenarios in paragraph 4 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper.

62. Nonetheless, it was also noted that several arguments had been raised to support the involvement of other organs – the need for political backing, to avoid frivolous referrals and for public international law expertise – and that all these arguments might also be applicable to self-referrals.

**Options for Security Council decisions regarding aggression**

63. A discussion was held on the basis of the approach that a Security Council decision was required for the Court to proceed. In this regard, three types of decision were identified. The Security Council could:

   (a) determine that an act of aggression had occurred and refer the situation to the Court in accordance with article 13(b) of the Rome Statute;
   (b) determine that an act of aggression had occurred;
   (c) refer a situation to the Court without making a determination of an act of aggression.

64. It was pointed out that under scenario a) and b) no difficulty arose. Under scenario a) the Court would receive an explicit go-ahead, coupled with a determination of an act of aggression; while under scenario b) the Court still needed to satisfy the requirements of article 13 of the Rome Statute. However, whether or not the Court could investigate the crime of aggression under scenario c) required further discussion.

65. Some participants voiced support for the view that the Security Council should be able to give a go-ahead for the Court to proceed without an express determination of an act of aggression. Attention was drawn to the fact that the Security Council had rarely used the term “aggression” in its past and current practice and that the Council might in some situations prefer to give the Court the “green light” to go ahead without making an explicit determination of an act of aggression. Such a solution might be useful for both the Court and the Security Council, which would be given an additional policy option. It was suggested, however, that a referral under article 13(b) of the Rome Statute which did not specify whether the basis of the referral was the crime of aggression, or another crime under the Statute, might not be sufficiently conclusive to establish the Court’s right to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. It was, however, also noted that such a referral might be particularly useful if it were to be assumed that a determination of an act of aggression by the Council could not be binding on the Court for reasons of due process. It was also noted that it might still be unclear at the time of the referral whether an act of aggression had occurred, and that the Security Council might make a determination at a later stage.

66. Attention was drawn to an earlier proposal according to which no precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction was required in the case of a referral by the Security Council.

67. Other participants expressed doubts as to whether the Court should be allowed to proceed without an express determination of the Security Council or another organ. It was argued that prior determination should be a clear precondition for the Court to exercise its
jurisdiction. According to this view, it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide whether an act of aggression had occurred. Furthermore, some concerns were raised as to whether the judges of the Court, who deal with individual criminal responsibility, should be entrusted with this decision. The point was also made that the elements of crime should include a determination on the existence of an act of aggression by the appropriate organ.4 Other participants opposed the inclusion of the precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction in the elements of crimes.

68. The view was also expressed that there should be a cumulative requirement: first, it should be determined by the Security Council that an act of aggression had occurred and then the Council should issue a specific go-ahead to the Court in accordance with article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.

69. Other participants suggested combining the options of a determination of an act of aggression by the Council and the possibility of a procedural go-ahead. Although the primary responsibility to determine that an act of aggression had occurred fell on the Security Council, some flexibility should nonetheless be left to enable the Court to act. Such an option was compatible with the competence of judges and the function of the Court. Issues of public international law might arise as preliminary issues in criminal proceedings, and the determination of whether an act of aggression had occurred would therefore not be beyond the competences and expertise of the Court’s judges.

**Binding nature of the determination of an act of aggression**

70. A discussion was held as to whether a determination of an act of aggression by another organ should be conclusive and therefore binding5 on the Court.

71. Many participants voiced a strong preference for a determination that was open for review by the Court, in particular in order to safeguard the defendant’s right to due process. The Prosecutor would bear the burden of proof regarding all elements of the crime, including the existence of an act of aggression, for which a prior determination by another organ would provide a strong case. Reference was made to the rights of the accused, in particular article 67, paragraph 1(i), of the Statute. It should always be possible for the defence to challenge the case of the Prosecutor on all grounds. Furthermore the point was made that new evidence which might refute the case for the existence of an act of aggression might emerge after a Security Council determination, and that it should be possible for the Court to take such new evidence into account.

72. It was noted that the possibility of such a review would allow the defence to dispute the existence of the act of aggression, argue that it was an act of self-defence, deny or minimize the participation of the individual, etc. Some participants considered that these complexities should not be overstated, since they could also arise when the Court had to deal with crimes against humanity and war crimes. It was also argued that safeguarding the rights of the accused was important, but that States also needed to be aware of the implications of a review by the Court of a Security Council determination that an act of aggression had occurred.

---

4 It was recalled that such an approach was reflected in the elements of the crime of aggression contained in the 2002 Coordinator’s paper, in which the existence of an act of aggression was defined as a precondition.

5 The word “prejudicial” was used in the revised version of the discussion paper.
Procedural options in the absence of a Security Council determination

73. Different views were expressed regarding the options contained in paragraph 5 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper.

Option 1

74. Some participants expressed their preference for retaining this option alone, since the other four options contained elements that could affect the independence and credibility of the Court.

Option 2

75. The view was expressed that only this option should be retained, since the others would interfere with the competencies of the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations.

Option 3

76. A proposal was made to replace the word “shall” in the first sentence with “may”. Another suggestion was to replace the word “recommendation” with “determination”. It was questioned whether it was meaningful for the Court to first request a decision from the General Assembly and to then proceed with a case in the absence of such a decision.

Option 4

77. Some doubts were expressed regarding the involvement of either the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice due to the fact that the intended political backing for the Court was not a consequence of the involvement, for example, of a legal organ such as the International Court of Justice; the possibility of avoiding frivolous referrals, cited as another point in favour of their involvement, might not necessarily be considered to be consistent with the mandate of the International Court of Justice.

78. As regards the phrase “acting on the vote of any nine members” in variant b), some participants considered that this amounted to interference with the competence of the Security Council and was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, which stipulated that the Council itself decides what is a procedural matter. Given that it was highly unlikely that the Security Council would consider a request for an advisory opinion a procedural matter, it was suggested that this controversial phrase should be deleted. On the other hand, it was also noted that this might be a good option to alleviate concerns regarding the role of the Security Council and that the Security Council might be amenable, at some stage, to accepting such an approach. It was therefore suggested that the variant be retained.

79. It was pointed out that the Council would, at that point of the process, already have had the opportunity to make a determination on the question of whether or not an act of aggression had occurred and should therefore not be asked by the Court to request an advisory opinion on the same matter.

80. Concern was expressed that an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice would seriously delay the case.

81. It was suggested that it should be clarified that the Court may proceed with the case if an advisory opinion already existed, irrespective of whether that advisory opinion had been requested by the Security Council or the General Assembly.
Lastly, it was noted that the only relevant question was whether or not the Court could proceed with an investigation on the basis of an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice and that the provision on aggression did not need to specify on the basis of what request the International Court of Justice would give such an advisory opinion.

Most delegations favoured deleting options 3 and 4 from paragraph 5 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper, though for different reasons.

C. The crime of aggression – defining the individual’s conduct

The discussions on this issue were guided by the growing tendency at the 2005 inter-sessional meeting to move from a “monistic” approach to a “differentiated” approach. It was pointed out that the 2002 Coordinator’s paper reflected a monistic approach in that the description of the individual’s conduct in paragraph 1 includes a description of the different forms of participation which would otherwise be addressed in article 25, paragraph 3, of the Rome Statute. Under the differentiated approach, the definition of the crime of aggression would be treated in the same manner as the other crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court: the definition of the crime would be focused on the conduct of the principal perpetrator, and other forms of participation would be addressed by article 25, paragraph 3, of the Statute. It was agreed in principle that the differentiated approach was preferable in that it treated the crime of aggression in the same way as the other crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. However, it was also agreed that the viability of the differentiated approach needed further exploration and that the monistic approach therefore needed, for the time being, to be retained in the 2002 Coordinator’s paper.

The view was reiterated that further work was required on the differentiated approach, including further discussion of the suggestions for an appropriate conduct verb, such as those contained in appendix I of the report of the 2005 inter-sessional meeting.

It was decided to focus at the current inter-sessional meeting on the issue of individual participation (article 25, paragraph 3(a) to (d), of the Statute). The question of the relationship of the definition of the crime of aggression to article 28 of the Statute (Responsibility of commanders and other superiors) and to article 33 (Superior orders and prescription of law) would be dealt with at a later stage and on the basis of an additional discussion paper submitted by the sub-Coordinator. The issue of individual attempt (article 25, paragraph 3(f)) would also be dealt with at a later stage.

There was widespread agreement that the use of the word “participates” should be avoided in the definition of the conduct element under the differentiated approach, in order to avoid overlap with the forms of participation under article 25, paragraph 3, of the Rome Statute.

Moreover, there was consensus among participants that aggression should be understood as a leadership crime. In this respect, the view was expressed that the leadership clause should refer to the ability to influence policy.

The terms “organize and direct”, “direct” and “order” were suggested as possible alternative conduct verbs. It was noted that this language was commonly found in counter-terrorism conventions and might be more established in the context of criminal law than the less common term “engage”, which was, however, favoured by some.

90. Some efforts were made to clarify the scope and meaning of the phrase “engaging a State”. Several participants expressed support for this notion. It was however suggested that it should be combined with “armed forces or other organs of a State”. Others voiced some concern about this phrase, as it was not commonly used in international law.

91. It was suggested that the conduct verb “lead” should be introduced, to underline the leadership role of the principal perpetrator. It was argued that this would be the most accurate description of the conduct of a leader, and that the verb “leads” could ideally be combined with the existing phrase “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression”. Several participants supported or expressed interest in the proposal, which should be considered further. It was however also noted that this option might be too narrow and only include a head of State or Government as principal perpetrator.

92. A discussion took place on whether to retain or delete the phrase “planning, preparation, initiation or execution”. The view was expressed that these words should be deleted since the elements of this notion were contained in the forms of participation under article 25, paragraph 3, of the Rome Statute. It was argued that the inclusion of these terms in the conduct element might blur the distinction between the primary and other perpetrators. Other participants preferred to retain the phrase. It was noted that this phrase reflected the typical features of aggression as a leadership crime, and its retention in the text would highlight the criminalized conduct and thus increase the deterrent effect of the provision. In this context, it was suggested further that the terms in this phrase should be used as conduct verbs (“plans, prepares, initiates or executes”). Some participants expressed interest in this proposal, others cautioned that these verbs would not adequately represent the activities of a leader, who in particular did not personally execute the use of armed force, but rather directed or led that execution.

93. Some participants expressed the view that the practical differences between these different options were limited. The options essentially differed in their delineation of the role of the principal versus the secondary perpetrator. This delineation had however no effect on the sentencing in accordance with the Statute.

**Options for the differentiated approach**

94. It was decided to reflect the discussions on the differentiated approach in an updated paper based on proposals A and B of appendix I of the report of the 2005 inter-sessional meeting. The updated options paper is contained in annex I to the present report. These options were drafted merely to highlight possible approaches to the definition of the conduct element under the differentiated approach; they were not meant to reflect drafting alternatives on other issues contained in paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper or to preclude discussion of other issues.

95. In a preliminary discussion of the above-mentioned options paper attention was drawn to the different initial phrases of proposals A and B. It was explained that the initial phrase of proposal B (using the term “means”) was intended to bring the definition more in line with the definitions in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, and to follow the differentiated approach more closely. The main difference between the two proposals was the inclusion of the phrase “planning, preparation, initiation or execution” in proposal A and its deletion in proposal B. The different wording of the initial phrase of proposal B could also be used in connection with proposal A. It was suggested that the leadership clause in proposal B be further clarified by including a reference to “the conduct of a person”.
D. Future work of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression

96. In view of the fact that the Assembly of States Parties at its fourth session decided that in the years 2006 to 2008 the Special Working Group should be allocated at least 10 exclusive days of meetings in New York during resumed sessions, and hold inter-sessional meetings as appropriate, it was suggested that the Chair convey a request to the Assembly for additional meeting time at a resumed sixth session of the Assembly, which would be held in the first trimester of 2008. This was deemed necessary for implementation of the relevant resolution of the Assembly of States Parties, especially as the Special Working Group had already decided to conclude its work at the latest 12 months prior to the Review Conference.

97. The Special Working Group expressed its appreciation for the contribution made by participants in the “Virtual Working Group” on the crime of aggression, which had been established in the latter part of 2005, and saw value in continuing to use that forum as a means of building upon the progress attained on the issue of the crime of aggression.

98. The Special Working Group was also informed of the contents of a letter, dated 12 May 2006, addressed to the President of the Assembly by the President of the Military Tribunal of Turin, regarding a Conference on International Criminal Justice to be held in Turin, Italy, from 2 to 11 October 2006 and the suggested convening of an inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group.

99. The Special Working Group welcomed the offer by the Italian authorities to host an inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group in the framework of the International Conference on International Criminal Justice to be held in Turin, Italy, from 2 to 11 October 2006.

100. The Italian representative indicated that the objective of holding such an inter-sessional meeting in Turin was to complement the work carried out at Princeton; the format of the meeting and the conditions for participation would be the same as at the Princeton inter-sessional meetings. The details of the agenda and programme of work of the Turin conference were still subject to modification and could be adapted to suit the needs of the Special Working Group.

101. The Turin conference was welcomed as one of the biggest and most significant events on international criminal justice in recent years. Gratitude was expressed to the Italian authorities both for organizing such an important event and for giving the issue of aggression a prominent place on the conference agenda. The view was expressed that the timing and venue of the conference might make it difficult to achieve the widest possible participation by States, if there was to be an inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group; therefore the meeting time allocated to the crime of aggression could also be used for panel discussions and workshops, which might help create the political momentum necessary in preparation for the Review Conference.

102. It was agreed that the Turin conference provided a unique opportunity to raise awareness of the importance of the crime of aggression, to conduct outreach activities and to place the crime of aggression in the larger context of international criminal justice. The Chair of the Special Working Group was requested to continue his consultations on the matter with the President of the Assembly of States Parties, including through the Bureau of the

---


8 Ibid.
Assembly, and with the representative of Italy, with a view to making optimal use of the time generously allocated to the crime of aggression at the Turin conference.
Annex I

Options for rewording the chapeau of the 2002 Coordinator’s paper under the differentiated approach

Proposal A

For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person

[leads] [directs] [organizes and/or directs] [engages in]

the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

Proposal B

For the purpose of the present Statute, “crime of aggression” means

[directing] [organizing and/or directing]
[engaging a State/the armed forces or other organs of a State in]

an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, when being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.

Under both proposals:

Article 25, paragraph 3

Insert a new subparagraph (d) bis:

“In respect of the crime of aggression, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) to (d), apply only to persons who are in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”

(Article 25, paragraph 3, does apply to the crime of aggression. See also Elements of Crimes, paragraph 8 of the general introduction.)

---

9 The options for rewording the chapeau referred to in this annex have the sole purpose of reflecting the status of the discussions on article 25, paragraph 3, of the Statute and are without prejudice to other proposed amendments to the chapeau.
Annex II\textsuperscript{10}

Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator

I. Definition of the crime of aggression and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction

1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person intentionally and knowingly orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

Option 1: Add “such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof”.

Option 2: Add “and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes an act which has the object or the result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof”.

Option 3: Neither of the above.

2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means an act referred to in United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which is determined to have been committed by the State concerned,

Option 1: Add “in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5”.

Option 2: Add “subject to a prior determination by the Security Council of the United Nations”.

3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraphs 3, 28 and 33, of the Statute do not apply to the crime of aggression.

4. Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, the Court shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. If no Security Council determination exists, the Court shall notify the Security Council of the situation before the Court so that the Security Council may take action, as appropriate:


Option 2: in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. Where the Security Council does not make a determination as to the existence of an act of aggression by a State:

Variant (a) or invoke article 16 of the Statute within six months from the date of notification.

\textsuperscript{10} This annex is an excerpt from PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2.
Variant (b) [Remove variant a.]

**Option 1:** the Court may proceed with the case.

**Option 2:** the Court shall dismiss the case.

**Option 3:** the Court shall, with due regard to the provisions of Articles 12, 14 and 24 of the Charter, request the General Assembly of the United Nations to make a recommendation within [12] months. In the absence of such a recommendation, the Court may proceed with the case.

**Option 4:** the Court may request

*Variant (a)* the General Assembly

*Variant (b)* the Security Council, acting on the vote of any nine members,

...to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and article 65 of the Statute of the International Court, on the legal question of whether or not an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned. The Court may proceed with the case if the International Court of Justice gives an advisory opinion that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned.

**Option 5:** the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the International Court of Justice has made a finding in proceedings brought under Chapter II of its Statute that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned.

**II. Elements of the crime of aggression (as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court)**

**Precondition**

In addition to the general preconditions contained in article 12 of the present Statute, it is a precondition that an appropriate organ\(^1\) has determined the existence of the act of aggression required by element 5 of the following Elements.

**Elements**

1: The perpetrator was in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the State which committed an act of aggression as defined in element 5 of these Elements.

2: The perpetrator was knowingly in that position.

3: The perpetrator ordered or participated actively in the planning, preparation or execution of the act of aggression.

4: The perpetrator committed element 3 with intent and knowledge.

5: An “act of aggression”, that is to say, an act referred to in United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, was committed by a State.

\(^1\) The elements in part II are drawn from a proposal by Samoa and were not thoroughly discussed.

\(^2\) See options 1 and 2 of paragraph 2 of part I. The right of the accused should be considered in connection with this precondition.
6: The perpetrator knew that the actions of the State amounted to an act of aggression.

7: The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

   **Option 1**: Add “such as a war of aggression or an aggression which had the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing the territory of another State or part thereof”.

   **Option 2**: Add “and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes an act which has the object or the result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof”.

   **Option 3**: Neither of the above.

8: The perpetrator had intent and knowledge with respect to element 7.

**Note:**
Elements 2, 4, 6 and 8 are included out of an abundance of caution. The “default rule” of article 30 of the Statute would supply them if nothing were said. The dogmatic requirement of some legal systems that there be both intent and knowledge is not meaningful in other systems. The drafting reflects these, perhaps insoluble, tensions.
Annex III

Annotated agenda

The aim of the meeting is to continue the discussions held at the previous inter-sessional meeting in June 2005, at the fourth session of the Assembly of States Parties in November/December 2005 and in the context of the “Virtual Working Group”. Three main sets of issues have emerged and these were addressed in discussion papers submitted to the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression. It is suggested that the work in Princeton focus on these areas (items 1 – 3 below).

Item 1) The “crime” of aggression – defining the individual’s conduct

Discussion paper 1 (The crime of aggression and article 25, paragraph 3, of the Statute) addresses the main question identified in this respect: How does the proposed definition of the individual’s conduct (cf. current wording of the Coordinator’s text) square with the provisions of article 25, paragraph 3 (a) to (d), of the Statute, which in general terms and as a “default rule” (Rome Statute Part 3: “General Principles of Criminal Law”) describe the forms of participation in a crime? Two different approaches have been identified. The Coordinator’s text implies a “monistic” approach in that the description of the individual’s conduct includes the description of different forms of “participation”, which would otherwise be addressed in article 25, paragraph 3; therefore the Coordinator’s text suggests that the application of that paragraph be excluded. The discussions in Princeton last year, however, brought support for a “differentiated” approach, which seeks to apply article 25, paragraph 3, to the crime of aggression as well. This might, however, necessitate a revision of the definition of the individual’s conduct in the Coordinator’s text, in order to remove the duplication. Some proposals were submitted to that effect, but they have not yet been thoroughly discussed. Discussion paper 1 raises questions and makes suggestions with respect to these proposals. (On a similar issue, namely the duplication of the phrase “intentionally and knowingly” in article 30 of the Statute and in the Coordinator’s text, participants agreed that the default rule of article 30 should apply).

Further discussion is also needed on the question of attempt (article 25, paragraph 3 (f) of the Statute). In this context, the 2005 meeting drew a useful distinction between (a) the collective act of aggression and (b) the individual act of participation in the collective act. The latter should be the focus under this item.

Item 2) The conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction

According to article 5, paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute, the provision on the crime of aggression should define the crime and set out “the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.” A substantial discussion took place on this issue at the 2005 meeting, which was further structured in discussion paper 2. It is suggested that the pertinent questions should be further discussed in the light of existing international law and that all the options should be clarified. Should the International Criminal Court exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression only after receiving an explicit/implicit approval from another organ? Which organ(s) would make that

---

14 PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2.
16 Ibid., annex II.A, para. 51.
17 Ibid., para. 33.
decision (Security Council, General Assembly, International Court of Justice)? Would such a decision—namely, that a State act of aggression has occurred—be a prejudicial determination for the International Criminal Court (i.e. a legally binding determination which cannot be refuted in Court by the accused), or only a procedural precondition? What are the consequences for the rights of the accused under any of these approaches?

**Item 3) The “act” of aggression – defining the act of the State**

Discussion paper 3 raises a number of questions regarding the definition of the “act of aggression”, i.e. the act of the State. The current Coordinator’s text defines such an act in essence by way of reference to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which includes an illustrative list of acts. The 2005 meeting discussed extensively whether the definition of aggression should indeed be accompanied by a list (the “specific” approach) or whether it would be preferable to define the act of aggression in a more “generic” way. The generic approach was the preferred option at the 2005 meeting, but such an approach needs further clarification and concrete proposals. Further matters under this item include: whether aggression should be qualified as being in “flagrant” or “manifest” violation of the Charter; and the attempt of aggression at the State level.

**Item 4) Other substantive issues**

Other substantive issues that were previously discussed could be taken up. The question of the applicability of article 121, paragraph 4 versus paragraph 5 was discussed extensively, but not conclusively: should the definition of the crime of aggression enter into force for all States Parties once ratification by seven eighths of States Parties is reached (paragraph 4); or should it only enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted such an “amendment” (paragraph 5)? It was argued, however, that such a discussion could be continued once there is more clarity on other issues. Furthermore, there has only been a preliminary discussion so far on the elements of crime, for the same reasons. Participants might want to raise other substantive issues as well.

**Item 5) Future work of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression**

The Assembly of States Parties at its fourth session (28 November to 2 December 2005) gave the work of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression a significant boost by deciding that “the Special Working Group in the years 2006 to 2008 shall be allocated at least 10 exclusive days of meetings in New York during resumed sessions, and hold inter-sessional meetings, as appropriate.” The current calendar of Assembly meetings, however, does not yet reflect the full amount of meeting time for the Special Working Group. It is suggested that the inter-sessional meeting consider the issue with a view to preparing the necessary detailed decision concerning the next formal meetings of the Special Working Group to be taken by the Assembly at its next session. Participants may want to raise further issues regarding the work of the Special Working Group, such as the usefulness of continuing the “Virtual Working Group”.

---

Annex IV

List of participants

Algeria
Mr. El Hadj Lamine
First Secretary, Legal Affairs
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Argentina
Ms. Maria Luz Melon
Second Secretary, Legal Officer
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Assembly of States Parties, International Criminal Court
Mr. Carsten Stahn
Associate Legal Officer
Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties

Assembly of States Parties, International Criminal Court
Mr. Renan Villacis
Director, ad interim
Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties

Australia
Ms. Carrie McDougall
Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Australia
Mr. Ben Playle
Legal Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Austria
Ms. Kerstin Mattischek
Attachée
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Azerbaijan
Ms. Rana Salayeva
Attachée
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Belgium
Ms. Fanny Fontaine
Legal Adviser
Ministry of Justice
Belgium
Ms. Valérie Delcroix
Attachée
Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs

Belize
Ms. Janine Coye Felson
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Bolivia
Mr. Ruddy Jose Flores Monterrey
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Brazil
Mr. Marcelo Baumbach
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Bulgaria
Ms. Krassimira Beshkova
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Burkina Faso
Mr. Koné Sifana Ibsen
Adviser, Chief of the Treaty Section
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Burundi
Ms. M. Louise Ndenzako
Legal Advisor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Cambodia
Mr. Hoy Sopheap
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Canada
Ms. Christine Hanson
Legal Officer
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Canada
Mr. Hugh Adsett
Counsellor, Legal Affairs
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
China
Mr. Qinmin Shen
Legal Officer
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

China
Mr. Qi Dahai
Deputy Division Director
Treaty and Law Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Colombia
Mr. Alvaro Sandoval Al Bernal
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Croatia
H.E. Mr. Frane Krnic
Ambassador
Embassy to the Netherlands

Czech Republic
Mr. Jakub Cimoradsky
Legal Advisor
Ministry of Defense

Czech Republic
Ms. Monika Popenkova
Legal Advisor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Democratic Republic of the Congo
Mr. Zenon Mukongo Ngay
Legal Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Denmark
Mr. Martin Mennecke
Adviser
Danish Institute for International Studies

Denmark
Mr. David Kendal
Head of Section
Department of International Legal Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dominican Republic
Mr. Edgar Torres Reynoso
Attorney, Unit for Specialized Studies and Research
Supreme Court

El Salvador
Ms. Maria del Pilar de Amaya
Director of International Legal Studies
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Estonia
Mr. Martin Roger
Legal Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Ethiopia
Mr. Reta Alemu Nega
First Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

European Union
Mr. Morten Knudsen
UN/ICC Desk Officer
Council Secretariat

Fiji
Mr. Sainivalati S. Navoti
Legal Counsel
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Finland
Ms. Anna Sotaniemi
First Secretary, Legal Advisor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

France
Ms. Brigitte Collet
First Counsellor, Legal Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

France
Mr. Didier Gonzalez
Counsellor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Germany
Ms. Anne Rübesame
Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Germany
Professor Claus Kress
Professor of Law
University of Cologne

Germany
Mr. Thomas Fitschen
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Germany
Mr. Boris Gehrke
Federal Foreign Office
Germany
Ms. Tanja Baerman
Desk Officer, Division for International Law
Federal Ministry of Justice

Greece
Ms. Phani Dascalopoulou-Livada
Legal Adviser
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Guatemala
Ms. Ana Cristina Rodriguez Pineda
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Haiti
Mr. Jacques Pierre Matilus
Adjoint Director, Legal Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Holy See
Mr. Robert Meyer
Attaché
Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations

Hungary
Mr. István E. Gerelyes
Deputy Director, International Law Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

India
Ms. Neeru Chadha
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Indonesia
Mr. Adam M. Tugio
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Ireland
Mr. Trevor Redmond
Assistant Legal Adviser
Department of Foreign Affairs

Israel
Mr. Daniel Taub
Principal Deputy Legal Advisor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Italy
Mr. Giuseppe Nesi
Professor, Legal Advisor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Italy
Mr. Roberto Bellelli
Judge, Legal Adviser
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jordan
Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud
First Secretary, Legal Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Kenya
Ms. Karen Odaba Mosoti
Legal Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Kenya
Ms. Jayne Toroitich
Second Secretary
Embassy to the Netherlands

Latvia
Ms. Ieva Miluna
Legal Adviser
Ministry of Justice

Liechtenstein
Mr. Till Papenfuss
Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Liechtenstein
Mr. Stefan Barriga
First Secretary, Legal Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Liechtenstein
H.E. Mr. Christian Wenaweser
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Lithuania
Ms. Birute Abruaitiene
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Malaysia
Mr. Ganeson Sivagurunathan
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Mexico
H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel Gomez-Robledo
Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Mongolia
Mr. Tulga Narkhuu
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Morocco
Mr. Karim Medrek
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Mozambique
Mr. Cristiano dos Santos
Director for Legal and Consular Affairs
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

Mozambique
Mr. Helio Antonio Nhantumbo
Chief of International Tribunals Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

Nepal
Mr. Ram Babu Dhakal
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Netherlands
Ms. Brechje Schwachöfer
Legal Adviser
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Netherlands
Mr. Johannes A.C. Bevers
Legal Adviser
Ministry of Justice

Netherlands
Mr. Niels Blokker
Legal Counsel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

New Zealand
Mr. Andrew Begg
Senior Legal Adviser
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Niger
Mr. Abdou Adamou
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Oman
Mr. Said Nasser Al Harthy
Chief of Legal Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Palau
Ms. Joan Yang
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Peru
Ms. Yella Zanelli
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Philippines
Ms. Anne Marie L. Corominas
Legal Adviser (Ad hoc)
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Poland
Mr. Andrzej Makarewicz
Senior Counsellor to the Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Portugal
Ms. Patrícia Galvão Teles
Consultant, Department of Legal Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Republic of Korea
Mr. Jung Yong Soo
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Republic of Korea
Mr. Kim Young-Sok
Associate Professor of Law
Ewha Womans University, College of Law

Republic of Korea
Mr. Yoo Hong-Keun
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Romania
Ms. Alina Orosan
Third Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Russian Federation
Mr. Stepan Yu. Kuzmenkov
First Secretary, Legal Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Russian Federation
Mr. Vladimir E. Tarabrin
Deputy Director, Legal Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Russian Federation
Mr. Gennady V. Kuzmin
Senior Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Samoa
Professor Roger Clark
Professor of Law
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

San Marino
Ms. Michela Bovi
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Senegal
Mr. Mamadou M. Loum
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Sierra Leone
H.E. Mr. Allieu Ibrahim Kanu
Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Slovak Republic
Mr. Peter Klanduch
Legal Officer
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Slovenia
Ms. Mateja Štrumelj
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Slovenia
Mr. Marko Rakovec
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Spain
Professor Carmen Quesada Alcalá
Lecturer of Public International Law
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Sweden
Mr. Jerzy Makarowski
Legal Advisor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Sweden
Mr. Pål Wrange
Principal Legal Advisor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Switzerland
Mr. Jürg Lauber
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. Mhd. Najib Elji
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Trinidad and Tobago
Mr. Eden Charles
First Secretary, Legal Affairs
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Trinidad and Tobago
Ms. Sasha Franklin
Legal Affairs Officer
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Turkey
Mr. Teoman Uykur
Legal Counsellor
Embassy to the United States

Turkey
Mr. Esat Mahmut Yılmaz
Legal Advisor
Turkish General Staff

Ukraine
Ms. Oksana Pasheniuk
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

United Republic of Tanzania
Mr. Andy A. Mwandembwa
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

United Kingdom
Mr. Chris Whomersley
Deputy Legal Adviser
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Zimbabwe
Mr. Chrispen Mavodza
Legal Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

NGO Coalition
Mr. Nicolaos Strapatsas
Researcher
University of Quebec, Montreal

NGO Coalition
Ms. Wasana Punyasena
Legal Officer
Coalition for the International Criminal Court

NGO Coalition
Mr. Bill Pace
Convener
Coalition for the International Criminal Court

NGO Coalition
Mr. Noah Weisbord
Harvard Law School

NGO Coalition
Ms. Jennifer Trahan
International Justice Program
Human Rights Watch

NGO Coalition
Professor David Scheffer
Professor of Law
Northwestern University School of Law

NGO Coalition
Mr. Benjamin Ferencz
Director
Pace Peace Center

NGO Coalition
Ms. Enid H. Adler
Counselor and Attorney at Law
Philadelphia Bar Association

NGO Coalition
Mr. Donald M. Ferencz
Executive Director
The Planethood Foundation

NGO Coalition
Ms. Jutta F. Bertram-Nothnagel
Deputy Secretary General for Relations with International Organizations
Union International des Avocats
NGO Coalition
Professor Daniel D.N. Nsereko
Professor of Law
University of Botswana

LISD
Professor Wolfgang Danspeckgruber
Director
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University